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The Theory and Practice 
of School Choice
Paul E. Peterson
conomists prove in theory what works in practice. So it is said. 
This paper demonstrates quite the opposite: It shows that school vouchers
work in practice, just as Rose and Milton Friedman proved in theory.
Simply defined, a voucher is a coupon for the purchase of a particular
good or service. Unlike a $10 bill, it cannot be used for any purpose whatso-
ever. Its use is limited to the terms designated by the voucher. But like a $10
bill, vouchers typically offer recipients a choice. For this reason, distant relatives
find coupons popular birthday presents for those whose tastes are unknown. 
It is not only in the retail market that vouchers or coupons are used. Food
stamps, housing allowances for the poor, and federal grants for needy students
are all voucherlike programs that fund services while giving recipients a range
of choice. It is the special contribution of the Friedmans that they have shown,
theoretically, how vouchers can also enhance school choice and school pro-
ductivity. By giving parents a school voucher, the government ensures that the
money will be used for an investment in human capital. But instead of requir-
ing attendance at a government-operated neighborhood school, no matter how
deficient, the family is given a choice among public and private schools in its
community. Schools can then compete for customer support. If educational
services do not differ significantly from other goods and services, then this mar-
ket-based approach to educational provision should yield efficiency gains. 
PUTTING THEORY TO A PRACTICAL TEST
Until the 1990s, there was little opportunity to rigorously test this applica-
tion of classical economic theory to the provision of educational services. But
in the past dozen years, small school voucher experiments have been initiated
in a variety of places, providing a chance to see if educational practice does in
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fact conform to classical theory, as explicated and applied to school vouchers
by the Friedmans.
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Publicly funded voucher programs enroll over 25,000 students in Milwaukee,
Cleveland, and Florida. All of these programs are restricted to low-income or
otherwise disadvantaged children. 
The oldest program, established in Milwaukee in 1990 at the urging of
local black leaders and then Gov. Tommy Thompson, was originally restricted
to secular private schools and to fewer than 1,000 students. Then, in 1998, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled constitutional a much larger program that
allowed students to attend religious schools as well. In 2002–03, over 11,000
students, more than 15 percent of the eligible population, were receiving vouch-
ers up to $5,783, making it the country’s largest and most firmly established
voucher program.
The Cleveland program, enacted in 1996, was of lesser significance until
the Supreme Court made it famous. Before the decision ruling it constitutional,
vouchers amounted to no more than $2,250 and were limited to approximately
4,000 students. After the Supreme Court decision, the number of students
increased to over 5,000, and the amount of the voucher, as of fall 2003, was as
high as $2,700.
The initial Florida program, established in 1999 after Gov. Jeb Bush had
campaigned on the issue, initially had less than 100 students but is poised to
become somewhat larger. Here, vouchers are offered to low-income students
attending failing public schools. Initially, only two schools in Pensacola were said
to be failing, but in 2002, ten more joined their ranks. A second Florida program,
which offers vouchers to students eligible for special education services, has
received less attention but is perhaps more significant. In 2002–03, over 8,000 of
Florida’s special education students were enrolled in nearly 500 private schools.
In addition to these publicly funded voucher programs, there are in the
United States numerous privately funded scholarship programs that operate
much like school voucher programs. All these programs limit the scholarships
to students from low-income families. They allow the parents to pick the pri-
vate school of their choice, but they pay approximately half the tuition for more
than 60,000 students. The largest program, operated by the Children’s Scholar-
ship Fund, offered 40,000 vouchers to students nationwide; over a half million
students applied, and a lottery was used to select the winners. In New York City,
Washington, D.C., and Dayton, Ohio, lotteries were also used to select winners
from a large number of other applicants. 
In other words, a variety of privately and publicly funded voucher pro-
grams are in operation. We can now look to see whether a program that works
in theory also works in practice. To put the theory to a careful test, we shall
report results from three randomized field trials similar to clinical (pill–placebo)
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scientific research. Both the nationwide Children’s Scholarship Fund program as
well as the programs in New York City, Washington, D.C. and Dayton, Ohio,
were conducted in a manner that allowed for a randomized field trial because
the voucher recipients were chosen by lot. This enabled the evaluation team to
compare those students and families who won the lottery with a control group
of students and parents who requested but did not receive a voucher and
remained in public school. The two groups of students—and their families—
are, on average, similar in all respects because the only difference between
them is that one group won the lottery while the other did not. This apple-to-
apple comparison allowed for a rigorous testing of a variety of propositions
drawn from classical economic theory.
Proposition 1: Market-Based Schools Tailor Services to Consumer Demand
Markets enhance the efficiency with which goods and services are pro-
vided simply by giving consumers services they prefer. Producers have an
incentive to create products for which there is a demand and to abandon those
that have little appeal to consumers. If men become bored with bell-bottom
trousers, retailers will not stock them. Production will instead shift to blue
denim cutoffs that strike a popular chord. So it is with schools. Private schools
that survive only if parents choose them are more likely to provide goods and
services that are in high demand; public schools, funded by taxpayer dollars,
are less likely to be so responsive.
One can test this proposition quite simply by looking at some basic char-
acteristics of a school. Parent surveys have long shown that parents prefer small
schools, K–8 (rather than middle or junior high) schools, smaller classes, and
more orderly environments. If market theory is correct, then we should expect
private schools to match parent preferences more closely than public schools do.
School Size. The ideal school size has never been identified. Scholars
have never been able to show convincingly whether students learn more in big
schools or small ones. Some studies indicate big schools are to be preferred;
others report opposite conclusions. Most studies show that school size makes
no significant difference at all. Nor do educational professionals agree on the
optimal size. According to some, large schools permit a varied curricula, social
experimentation, student diversity, and economies of scale. But others say the
intimate atmosphere of a small school is crucial for effective learning. 
But if scholars and educational professionals find it difficult to reach a con-
sensus, most parents have drawn their own conclusions. They like small
schools. All else equal, they will take a small school over a big one. 
Well aware of parental preference, private schools, operating in a market-
place, give parents the size of school they prefer. If parents receive a voucher,
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ticipating in the evaluations in New York, Washington, D.C., and Dayton said
their son or daughter, if in private school, had an average of 278 schoolmates.
By contrast, students who remained in public school had, on average, 450 fel-
low students. 
Age Structure of School. Should students attend schools that have a
broad or narrow age range? Should children remain in the same school through
eighth or ninth grade? Or should they change to a middle school after grade
four? Or to a junior high school after grade six? Traditional educators favor
schools with grades K–8, as in the days of the little red schoolhouse. But in
response to studies by progressive educators, many school districts today have
established middle schools and junior high schools. 
Drawing on the tenets of classical economic theory, one expects private
schools not to follow suit. Once they have recruited a student customer, they
are likely to want to keep the child for as many years as possible. They will thus
try to keep older students at their school for as many grades as feasible. And it
is likely, though not certain, that most parents prefer elementary schools to mid-
dle schools and junior high schools, if simply to avoid the anxiety of changing
schools but also, perhaps, to avoid schools that must deal wholesale with the
problems associated with puberty and adolescence. 
Our findings are consistent with these expectations. In our study, we
found fewer students moving from one private school to another simply
because they had “graduated” from an elementary school to enter a middle or
junior high school. In New York City, for example, the percentage of young stu-
dents changing schools just because they were “graduating” was 15 percent
higher if the child was in a public school.
2 In short, private school students are
more likely to stay in the same school for a longer sequence of grades. 
Class Size. Among scholars, there is no more consensus on class size than
on the optimum size of or the appropriate age structure for a school. Some
econometric studies show that students perform better in smaller classes. Oth-
ers show that the size of the class, within the fifteen- to thirty-student range,
makes little difference. Still other studies suggest that class size makes a differ-
ence only if teachers are of low quality. 
But if scholars cannot agree, parents—and students—can. The demand
for smaller classes is an educational universal. Only those who have to pay for
the smaller class demur, simply because class-size reduction is one of the most
expensive of all educational innovations. 
Despite the cost, private schools are more likely to respond to the market
demand than public schools. In our study, there were, on average, twenty stu-
dents per class in the private schools attended by participants in the study, as
compared with twenty-three students per class in the public schools attended
by those in the control group. 
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fact, little short of astonishing, given the fact that expenditures per pupil are
much higher in the public sector (see below). Reducing class size is an expen-
sive proposition because smaller classes require the recruitment of more teachers,
raising the personnel costs at the school. Private schools nonetheless make a
special effort to keep their classes as small as fiscally feasible because market
demand for this characteristic of educational services is particularly strong.
Discipline. Educational professionals disagree over the appropriate learn-
ing climate a school should seek to create. Old-fashioned educators generally
imposed strict rules. But progressive theorists say a more relaxed climate that
allows students to pursue their own interests in a flexible manner provides
greater opportunities for self-expression. Their position has been reinforced by
civil libertarians who have sought to protect student rights.
But even though the appropriate balance between school order and indi-
vidual creativity and self-expression is hotly contested among educational and
legal theorists, most parents expect an orderly, disciplined school, where learn-
ing can go forward unimpeded by rowdiness and conflict. It is difficult to imag-
ine a private school surviving if its disciplinary climate is problematic. Low-
income parents are unlikely to pay tuition to a school that is known to have
serious problems with cheating, fighting, truancy, or racial conflict. But when
students are assigned to a public school on the basis of residential location, fam-
ilies will have no choice but to send their child to that school, despite the sever-
ity of its discipline problems. Given this clear market demand, private schools
can be expected to respond by placing a greater priority on maintaining order
in school than public schools do. 
That is precisely what we found. Parents were asked to rate how serious
a problem at their child’s school were each of the following: fighting, cheating,
property destruction, truancy, tardiness, and racial conflict. In each case, the
problem at the school was less for those children attending a private school. For
example, only 32 percent of the private school parents in the three cities said
fighting was a serious problem, while 63 percent of the public school parents
said it was. Property destruction was said to be a serious problem by just 22
percent of the private school parents, but by as much as 42 percent of the pub-
lic school ones. Racial conflict was a problem for 22 percent of the students 
at private schools, compared with 34 percent of those in public school. In in-
terpreting these findings, it is important to keep in mind that the children and
families are similar (except that one group won the voucher lottery), so the dif-
ferences between the public and private schools must be attributed to the learn-
ing environment at the school, not to family characteristics.
In sum, market-based schools are more likely to give customers preferred
services—smaller schools with broad age ranges, smaller classes, and more
orderly educational environments.42 Paul E. Peterson
Proposition 2: Market-Based Schools Will Communicate with Customers
Educational theorists differ as to the appropriate role that parents should
play in their child’s education. Although many believe that parents should be
involved in their child’s educational experiences, others wonder whether exces-
sive involvement will encourage parental interference in the educational process
or introduce inequities, as better educated, higher income parents seek special
advantages for their child. Many school boards, for example, restrict parents
from participating in fund-raisers for their child’s school on the grounds that it
gives the children at these schools advantages not shared by students else-
where, where parents may be less motivated.
But if educational theory is uncertain as to the desirability of parental
involvement in the work of the school, classical economic theorists expect pri-
vate schools to ignore any doubts on this score. According to classical theory,
private firms are expected to search for ways of better communicating with and
involving their customers with their product—simply in order to maintain their
consumer base. Retailers expend vast sums acquiring and maintaining informa-
tion on those who have been customers in the past—on the reasonable assump-
tion that these are precisely the individuals most likely to make similar purchases
in the future. Once a family buys a telephone from Circuit City or Radio Shack,
the company routinely duns them with information on their latest gadgets. High
school seniors who express the slightest interest in a private college will soon
discover their mailboxes full of campus photographs taken at the loveliest time
of the year. 
If classical theory is correct, then private schools will put aside any doubts
about equity or excessive parental involvement and develop techniques for
involving parents in the work of the school. For children matriculated at a
school, retention will become a major priority, in part out of a concern for the
well-being of the child, but, according to market theory, also because continu-
ing revenue flows from tuition are essential to the school’s survival. Schools will
develop regular channels of communication with parents so as to ensure their
engagement in the life of the school—in part because most educators believe
parents should be involved in their child’s education, but also, classical theory
says, because engagement reinforces commitment and retention.
For public schools, retention of students and engagement of parents are
less critical. Schooling is compulsory until the age of sixteen; funding comes
from the taxpayer, not from tuition; and most school officials enjoy job protec-
tion. Public school officials will thus have fewer market incentives and will
place higher priority on the need to protect the school from excessive parental
involvement.
Homework. The issue arises even when it comes to assigning homework.
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schools expect students to work on their studies at home on a daily basis, then
parents are given routine opportunities to influence—even interfere with—the
learning process. The better educated families can use this as a vehicle to give
their child special advantages. 
Private schools pay little attention to such advice, however. More regularly
than public schools, they assign homework to students, and when they do, the
homework is regarded by the parents as more appropriate. In the three cities,
72 percent of the private school parents reported that their child had more than
one hour of homework per day, compared with 56 percent of the public school
parents. Ninety percent of the private school parents said the homework was at
the appropriate level of difficulty, compared with 72 percent of the public
school parents. 
School Communications. Private schools also communicate more fre-
quently with parents in other ways. Private school parents were more likely than
the control group of public school families to say they receive a newsletter from
the school, participate in instruction, are notified of disruptive behavior the first
time it happens, receive regular notes from the teacher, speak to classes about
their job, are kept regularly informed about student grades, and attend open
houses at the school. They are also more likely to be asked to participate in
fund-raising activities. 
In interpreting these findings, it is important, once again, to remember that
the groups of parents whose children attend public and private schools in this
study were similar because it was just random chance—a lottery—that deter-
mined whether or not they received a voucher opportunity. The enhanced
parental engagement with the school was not due to special qualities of the pri-
vate school parents; rather, it was due to the greater efforts by the school to
involve these parents in the educational life of the child. Classical theory sug-
gests that these schools have a strong interest in doing so.
Retention Rates. How do these efforts by private schools to maintain
communications with families affect their retention rates? Classical theory
expects higher turnover in the private than in the public sector simply because,
in the private sector, parents are paying for the child’s education. And if chil-
dren are going to public school, compulsory education laws ensure that they
remain in school. Furthermore, private firms wish to keep only those consumers
who contribute to profits. They do not want customers who fight, steal, disrupt
the business environment, and loiter for long periods of time without purchas-
ing a product. None of these folks are good for business. Similarly, private
schools can be expected to ask students to leave if they do not concentrate on
their studies and comport themselves appropriately. Meanwhile, public schools
are expected by law to provide for the schooling of all those living within their
jurisdiction. One therefore expects higher rates of suspension, expulsion, and
turnover in private than in public schools.44 Paul E. Peterson
Surprisingly, classical theory, for once, seems to fail us. Private and public
school differences are less than these considerations suggest. When parents were
asked whether their child had changed schools during the school year or antici-
pated a change over the summer, we found no significant differences between
private and public school parents. Although turnover rates for this low-income,
inner-city population were high in both sectors, there was little difference
between them. Apparently, a high degree of residential mobility leads to signif-
icant turnover in the public sector, one that is roughly equivalent to that in the
private sector. We also did not find, in most cases, systematic differences in stu-
dent suspension rates. Generally speaking, the likelihood that a child would be
suspended varied between 5 and 10 percent in both sectors. However, among
older students in Washington, D.C., we discerned higher suspension rates in the
private sector. These students entered private schools with vouchers after hav-
ing attended public schools for several years, and it was not clear that they had
adjusted easily to private-sector expectations. Nonetheless, all the evidence,
taken together, reveals a greater capacity to retain low-income students in pri-
vate schools than classical theory might, at first glance, lead one to expect.
There are a couple of ways of explaining the anomaly. For one thing, the
schools attended by these low-income voucher recipients were themselves low-
tuition schools that often were in need of additional students. Efforts to main-
tain enrollment may have been particularly intense. Second, students may
quickly adapt to the expectations of a school if it becomes clear that they will
be suspended or expelled. Just as it takes but one rotten apple to spoil a bar-
rel, so the barrel can be preserved simply by tossing out the one bad apple. Sus-
pension, expulsion, and turnover rates may rise in the public sector simply
because students realize that attendance at the school is a matter of right. Pri-
vate schools tell students from the very beginning that continuation at the
school depends upon conformity to school norms.
Proposition 3: Choice Breeds Happiness
Many professional educators worry about giving parents a choice of school.
If parents have choice, they may select a school for what are thought to be
wrong reasons—religious affiliation, racial composition, athletic facilities, con-
venience, or simply the school friends are attending. They also fear the degree
of educational stratification that may accompany systems of educational choice.
But if educators worry about choice, classical economic theory celebrates
it. For one thing, customers are expected to be happier if they have a choice.
Few propositions drawn from classical economic theory are as widely accepted
as this one. Tell a customer they have no choice of doctors and they will com-
plain bitterly about the one they have. Allow them to choose freely among med-
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Not everyone agrees as to just why choice breeds happiness, however.
Some say that satisfaction levels, as reported in surveys, are artificially inflated
because consumers hate to admit a mistake. The “lemon” one purchased from
the used car dealer has a marvelous tinted window, reason enough to purchase
it. The sofa is the right length, even if uncomfortable. But self-delusion has its
limits. The longer one has the product, the less likely one is to ignore its defi-
ciencies. Sooner or later, the lemon will be sold and the couch replaced.
Classical theory therefore expects to find, initially, higher levels of parental sat-
isfaction with private schools, but it also expects these satisfaction levels to attenu-
ate with time. What may seem to be a great new world for one’s child in the first
instance may not prove to be as wonderful an opportunity as the years unfold. But
if some decline is to be expected, the rate of decline is dependent upon product
quality. If the used car proves itself, satisfaction levels could persist for years to come. 
In the evaluations of the three voucher programs in New York, Washing-
ton, and Dayton, parents were asked about their satisfaction with a wide range
of school characteristics, including what was taught, teacher skill, the quality of
the academic program, school discipline, school safety, student respect for
teachers, class size, clarity of school goals, parental involvement, and other
characteristics. At the end of the first year, parents in private schools expressed
much higher levels of satisfaction. For example, 54 percent of the private school
parents expressed a high level of satisfaction with the quality of the academic
program, compared with 15 percent of the public school parents. For school dis-
cipline, the percentages were 53 percent and 15 percent, respectively. The pat-
tern remained much the same for many of the other characteristics.
Because the responses to many different questions fell into a common pat-
tern, it was possible to construct an overall satisfaction scale. Differences on this
scale at the end of the first year were very large, 0.92 standard deviations, for
the three cities combined. Very seldom does one find differences this large
between two groups participating in a randomized field trial.
But did this very large difference in satisfaction levels persist over time, or
did it sharply attenuate? We were able to track this most carefully in New York
City, where we obtained satisfaction reports from parents in each of three years.
At the end of the first year, satisfaction levels were 1.01 standard deviations
higher among the private school parents; at the end of two years, it climbed
slightly to 1.05 standard deviations; by year three, it had fallen slightly to 0.94
standard deviations. In short, consumer satisfaction with vouchers was real, not
ephemeral. Choice breeds satisfaction in more than just the very short run.
Proposition 4: Market-Based Schools Are More Productive
Educators worry about the educational productivity of market-based
schooling. Private schools with a religious affiliation may place a higher pre-46 Paul E. Peterson
mium on maintaining the child’s religious identity than in providing them with
an education. For-profit schools may skim profits by providing the most
mechanical educational experience.
Classical economic theorists think otherwise. Markets stimulate productiv-
ity, says classical economic theory, not only by better matching goods and serv-
ices to consumer preferences, but also by finding more efficient ways of pro-
ducing these items at higher quality. So rapid is technological innovation in the
computer industry that PCs today have greater computational capacities at lower
costs than those available just a year or so ago.
Similar efficiency gains are unknown to modern American public educa-
tion. Here the costs—in real 2002 dollars—have climbed steadily over the past
half century, rising from $3,500 per pupil in 1960 to nearly $9,500 per pupil in
2000, a near threefold increase. Despite this increase in expenditures, student
performances, as measured by standardized tests, have barely budged. Admit-
tedly, test scores are not the only item to be measured in an overall assessment
of school productivity, but they certainly are among the most important. If a
near threefold increase in expenditure yields no gains in a key educational out-
come, certainly there are severe signs of diminishing productivity. Indeed, we
know of no other major sector of the American economy that has become so
markedly less productive over this period of time.
3
But does school choice increase productivity, either by raising student per-
formance or by reducing school costs? We were able to obtain a fair compari-
son of educational costs in public and Catholic schools in New York City
because both systems made available to us financial records that facilitated a
more considered comparison than is usually possible. To make the comparison
fair, we excluded from public school costs the items that were probably not
being provided by Catholic schools, including monies spent on transportation,
special education, school lunches, other ancillary services, and all the costs of
the administrative staff at the city, borough, and district levels. All these deduc-
tions constituted 40 percent of the total cost of public schools in New York City.
The remaining public school costs in 1998 were still $5,000 per pupil, more than
twice the $2,400 per pupil cost of Catholic schooling in the city. 
Despite this resource gap, Hispanic students attending private schools did
equally well as their public school counterparts, and African American students
did strikingly better. After three years, private school African American students
were performing at a level that was nearly two grade levels higher than the con-
trol group remaining in public schools. In short, private schools, with half the
resources, did equally well at providing educational opportunity for Hispanic
students and considerably better for African American ones. Once again, these
differences cannot be attributed to higher initial capacity or commitment on the
part of student or family because the two groups of students were originally
similar, save for the fact that the one group had won the lottery.The Theory and Practice of School Choice 47
Proposition 5: The Characteristics of Both Public and Private Schools
Affect Voucher Usage
According to classical economic theory, both push and pull factors are likely
to affect voucher usage. Families will be pushed away from public schools, if they
find them unsatisfactory. And they will be drawn toward private schools, if they
have qualities families find especially appealing. However, they will remain in pri-
vate schools only if they remain satisfied with the new educational opportunity. 
The decision to use a voucher can be broken into the following three
steps: (1) applying for a voucher; (2) using a voucher, if offered one; (3) remain-
ing in a private school over time. Each step requires a greater commitment than
the previous one, especially when vouchers pay only about half the cost of
attending a private school (as was the case in the situations examined here).
The process of obtaining and using a voucher can be usefully compared
to the processes of courtship and marriage with which most are familiar. The
initial decision to date requires little commitment. If sufficiently unhappy, the
love-starved may agree even to a blind or computer-generated date. Factors
explaining decisions at this point are more likely to be “push” considerations,
such as prolonged loneliness, the collapse of a previous love affair, or a divorce.
Agreeing to marriage is another matter, one that must be taken seriously by both
parties. Here the pull factors of the potential mate are more likely to be critical.
And, of course, the marriage persists only if the relationship is successful. 
So it is with vouchers. Each step—from initial expression of interest to the
decision to matriculate at a specific school to retention at that school—requires
a greater commitment on the part of both the parent and the private school the
child is attending. Considerations that induce voucher applications are not
always the same as those that lead families to use them, when offered the
opportunity, or to keep families within voucher programs over time. 
The best information on the first stage of the process, the application for
a voucher, comes from an evaluation of the nationwide scholarship program
administered by the Children’s Scholarship Fund. In this case, my colleagues
and I were able to compare low-income applicants with all low-income families
eligible for participation in the voucher program.
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Push factors were important at the applicant stage. Those who applied
were less likely to be satisfied with the public school their child was currently
attending. Only 24 percent said they were “very satisfied” with the academic
quality of the school, compared with 38 percent of all eligible parents. Satisfac-
tion with public schools may also help explain why vouchers were also much
more attractive to African American families than to either white or Hispanic
families. Forty-nine percent of the applicants were African American, compared
with just 26 percent of the eligible population. Presumably, public schools
attended by African American students are particularly problematic.48 Paul E. Peterson
But pull factors were also important. Families were more likely to apply
for a voucher when they were actively engaged in religious life. Since most pri-
vate schools have a religious affiliation, it is very likely that this religious dimen-
sion was something these families were seeking. Otherwise, differences
between applicants and eligibles were modest. Applicants were only slightly
more likely to live in two-parent households or to have mothers who were col-
lege educated. Even those with disabilities were as likely to apply as those who
were not. However, applicant families were more likely to have lived in their
current residence for two or more years, a sign that voucher applicants were
better embedded in community networks than eligible families more generally. 
Pull factors become especially important at the second stage of the
voucher utilization process, the point at which lottery winners must decide
whether to use the voucher offered them. At this point, a critical pull factor is
the sheer availability of a private school. Thus, usage rates were higher in those
metropolitan areas where the private school share of the market was the greater.
Another indication that families were being drawn to the private sector is the
fact that those regularly engaged with religious institutions, especially if
Catholic, were more likely to use the voucher. Since over two-thirds of private
schools are Catholic, the availability of private schools to active members of this
religious faith gave these families a special opportunity. Financial issues also
seem important, inasmuch as family members with more children were less
likely to take up the opportunity. For low-income families, placing several chil-
dren in a private school may have been too taxing, especially since in this pro-
gram the voucher usually covered only about half the cost. 
Finally, evidence with respect to differences in ethnic response at this stage
of the process is mixed. In the national Children’s Scholarship Fund evaluation,
African American families were much less likely to use a voucher when offered
the opportunity. But in New York City, they were much more likely to use
vouchers, if offered.
5 These quite opposite effects remain large even after many
other factors are taken into account in the analysis. Nor is there reason to ques-
tion the quality of the data in either case. The inconsistency of the findings from
the two evaluations may be reconciled by considering a key pull factor—the
availability of private schools in African American neighborhoods. In New York,
private schools may have been readily available to African American students, in
part because many Catholic schools remain in the New York neighborhoods
where African Americans live. The Catholic immigrant groups that built the
schools have left these neighborhoods, but the well-established Catholic arch-
diocese in the city has made strenuous efforts to keep the schools intact. This is
probably less true nationwide. Private schools, Catholic or not, may be scarce in
neighborhoods with a high concentration of African American families. 
The New York evaluation also provides information concerning those who
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expected, satisfaction with the private school critically affects the likelihood of
leaving the program. Also significant is the match between the religious affilia-
tion of the family and the school, a sign, once again, that preference for a par-
ticular kind of educational experience is important to voucher users. Finally,
African American students are less likely to remain in private school than are
students from other ethnic groups.
In short, both push and pull factors affect voucher usage. Families are
attracted to a voucher program if they are dissatisfied with public schools
and/or they seek special qualities (such as religious engagement) from a private
school. But they are unlikely to continue to use a private school if they become
dissatisfied with its quality. 
Proposition 6: Public Schools Will Respond to Competition, Perhaps
If classical economic theory is correct, then public schools, confronted by
the possibility that they could lose substantial numbers of students to compet-
ing schools within the community, may be expected to respond by reaching out
more effectively to those they are serving. 
In the randomized field trials we conducted, the number of voucher stu-
dents was too small for their presence to have any discernable impact on the
public schools in these cities. But in Milwaukee, voucher students constitute
over 10 percent of the student population whose education is publicly financed.
Another 10 percent of the students attend charter schools, which also provide
families with a choice of school. Substantial school choice has been available to
families since 1998, providing the best setting in which to identify how vouchers
impact public schools in the vicinity. 
Early research on Milwaukee suggests that vouchers are having an impact
on the public schools, albeit slowly. Relying on evidence collected in 1999, only
one year after the expanded program had begun, American Enterprise Institute
scholar Frederick Hess concluded that public schools had few incentives to
respond to the competition—in part because their revenues and the job oppor-
tunities of school employees were protected from the competition. At least in the
first few years, the schools seemed to be making little more than symbolic
responses to the competition.
6 But other evidence is more encouraging. Harvard
economist Caroline Minter Hoxby found signs that public school test scores rose
more rapidly in those Wisconsin public schools that were impacted by vouchers.
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Even the threat of a voucher can have a positive effect on test scores. Research
by Manhattan Institute scholar Jay Greene shows that when public schools were
in danger of failing twice on the statewide Florida exam, making their students
eligible for vouchers, these public schools made special efforts to avoid failure.
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Despite these positive early signs, one cannot expect rapid transformation
of public schools, even if voucher programs should expand, simply because pub-50 Paul E. Peterson
lic financing arrangements are often designed to protect public schools against
competition. Although financial arrangements vary from one state to the next, on
average, nationwide, 49 percent of the revenue for public elementary and sec-
ondary schools comes from state governments, while 44 percent is collected from
local sources and the balance received in grants from the federal government.
Most of the revenue school districts get from state governments is distributed on
a “follow the child” principle. The more students in a district, the more money it
receives from the state. If a child moves to another district, the state money fol-
lows the child. Local revenue, most of which comes from the local property tax,
stays at home, no matter where the child goes. As a result, the amount of money
the district has per pupil actually increases if a district suffers a net loss of stu-
dents, simply because local revenues can now be spread over fewer pupils.
The voucher programs in Milwaukee, Cleveland, Florida, and Colorado
have all been designed to protect public schools from serious financial prob-
lems when students accept vouchers. The state money follows the child, but the
local revenue stays behind in local public schools, which means that more
money is available per pupil. In Milwaukee, per-pupil expenditures for public
school children increased (in real dollars) by 22 percent between 1990, when
the first small voucher program began, and 1999, when vouchers were preva-
lent. The rise in expenditures was from $7,559 to $9,036. Not all of the increase
was a direct result of the voucher program, but the example shows that public
schools do not necessarily suffer financially when voucher programs are put
into effect.
In short, public schools thus far have few financial incentives to respond
to voucher competition.
Proposition 7: Economic Logic Does Not Necessarily Translate into
Political Logic
School vouchers in practice seem to operate much as the Friedmans have
long suggested they would work in theory. When theoretically well-grounded
innovations prove successful in practice, one ordinarily expects a fairly rapid
diffusion of the innovation. According to classical economic theory, followers
will adopt the innovations of industry leaders simply in order to survive the
competitive threat.
Such a response is less likely, however, when vested interests adversely
affected by the innovation can use government authority to keep the innovation
from spreading. In the early seventeenth century, the watermen of London
sought to keep wagons and coaches from appearing on the city streets. A per-
ceptive architectural historian tells the story in this way:
One gets an impression of the importance of the [Thames] river traffic on
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amounted to 40,000 in a city whose entire population hardly exceeds
200,000. By means of propaganda, they made war on all other methods of
transport, by wagon or by coach, but it was of no use. In 1601 they suc-
ceeded in getting a Bill passed in the House of Commons “to restrain the
excessive and superfluous use of coaches.” This was, however, stopped by
the House of Lords.
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While the watermen failed in this instance, they regularly impeded the
advancement of land transport in the decades to follow. Similarly, throughout
much of the twentieth century, American railroads used their access to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to protect themselves from the trucking industry.
Today, pharmaceutical companies routinely fight the deployment of generics as
an infringement on their patents. In short, government authority to regulate is
often used to protect producers from competition.
Public schools, as traditionally organized, are no less well positioned to
protect their interests than were London’s seventeenth century watermen. Much
like London’s river traffic industry, the educational industry is today very large,
constituting no less than 5 percent of the American economy. Most Americans
once attended public schools themselves, and, as a result, their affection for this
institution, no matter how aging and sluggish, is deep and abiding. The indus-
try’s political flank is well protected by two major unions, the National Educa-
tion Association and the American Federation of Teachers, which are among the
most active organizations in national, state, and local politics. In local school
board elections, teachers vote with a frequency unrivaled by ordinary citizens—
especially if they live and work in the same district.
10 Fighting the spread of
school vouchers is a top union priority. When doing so, unions can invoke the
public school as the symbol of democracy and vouchers as an unconstitutional
threat to the unity of the American people. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND BALKANIZATION
Ever since the voucher concept was first enunciated by the Friedmans, its
constitutionality has been questioned by those who said it violated the estab-
lishment of religion clause of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment. But in
2002, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court found, in the case of Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, that the Cleveland school voucher program was constitu-
tional. The court declared that the program did not violate the establishment
clause, as plaintiffs had argued, because it allowed parents a choice among both
religious and secular schools. There was no discrimination either in favor of or
against religion. 
But even though school vouchers have passed this crucial constitutional
test, many have argued that they would prove divisive in a pluralist society with
multiple religious traditions. In his dissent from the majority opinion in Zelman,52 Paul E. Peterson
Justice Stephen Breyer saw the decision as risking a “struggle of sect against
sect.” And Justice John Stevens said he had reached his decision by reflecting
on the “decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Mid-
dle East to mistrust one another. . . . [With this decision] we increase the risk of
religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.”
These dissents echo the concerns of many distressed by the worldwide
rise in fundamentalist religious conviction, worries that have intensified since
9/11. But though the concerns are genuine enough, it’s hardly clear that gov-
ernment-controlled indoctrination of young people is the best tool for conquer-
ing intolerance. On the contrary, this strategy proved counterproductive in
many parts of the former Soviet Union. Historically, the United States has
achieved religious peace not by imposing a common culture but by ensuring
that all creeds, even those judged as dangerous by the enlightened, have equal
access to democratic processes. 
Of course, religious conflict is part and parcel of American political his-
tory. In the late nineteenth century, many objected to the establishment of
Catholic schools. Indeed, anti-immigrant sentiment was so strong that amend-
ments to state constitutions were enacted that seemed to forbid aid to religious
schools. Many of these provisions are the so-called Blaine amendments, dating
to the nineteenth century, when James Blaine, a senator from Maine and a
Republican presidential candidate, sought to win the anti-immigrant vote by
campaigning to deny public funds to Catholic schools. (Blaine is perhaps most
famous for tolerating a description of Democrats as the party of “Rum, Roman-
ism, and Rebellion.”) In its classic version, the Blaine amendment read as 
follows:
No money raised by taxation for the support of public schools, or derived
from any public fund therefore, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall
ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised
or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
Blaine-like clauses in state constitutions are being invoked by those seeking to
forestall voucher initiatives. In a number of cases, state courts have interpreted
these clauses to mean nothing more than what the Supreme Court defines as
the meaning of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. If this view
prevails in state courts, then vouchers do not violate these state constitutional
clauses now that they have been found constitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court. And if the Blaine amendments are invoked as a basis for finding vouchers
in violation of state constitutions, the Supreme Court may eventually be asked
to decide whether, on account of their nativist and anti-Catholic origins, these
Blaine amendments—and their derivatives—are themselves unconstitutional.
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The controversies over religion seem more heated in the political and legal
world than in the classroom, however. While exceptional cases can always beThe Theory and Practice of School Choice 53
identified, there is little evidence that religious schools typically teach intoler-
ance. Indeed, careful studies have shown that students educated in Catholic
schools are both more engaged in political and community life and more toler-
ant of others than public school students. After enduring harsh criticism from
critics in a Protestant-dominated America, Catholic schools took special pains to
teach democratic values.
12 The more recently established Christian, Orthodox
Jewish, and Muslim schools can be expected to make similar attempts to prove
they, too, can create good citizens. 
As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion, if
Justices Breyer’s and Stevens’ fears were real, we’d know it already. She showed
that taxpayer dollars flow to religious institutions in multiple ways—through Pell
Grants to sectarian colleges and universities; via child care programs, in which
churches, synagogues, and other religious institutions may participate; and
through direct aid to parochial schools of computers and other instructional mate-
rials. If thriving religious institutions create a Balkanized country, she seems to
say, this would already have happened. 
Nor, say voucher proponents, have public schools eliminated social divi-
sions. As Justice Clarence Thomas argued in his concurring opinion, “The fail-
ure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of
poverty, dependence, criminality and alienation that continues for the remain-
der of their lives. If society cannot end racial discrimination, at least it can arm
minorities with the education to defend themselves from some of discrimina-
tion’s effects.” In other words, vouchers may help heal, not intensify, the country’s
most serious social division. 
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